mideastislam

First, the easy story - extremists attacking a play (the actors in the play) at Yamama College.

Part One:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8N9fXNhn58


Part Two:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-UW0UkTNYE&mode=related&search=

This time, I found the Arab Times coverage a little more bland than this footage indicates.

2. What about Lebanon? For the absurd aspects of the story, check As`ad's blog, or just listen to CNN. "Violence feared" - why? Because Hizbullah continues its PEACEFUL protest; although a young Shi`i protester has already been killed.
It's Hizbullah and "its Syrian allies" - well exactly how is Aoun a Syrian ally?
CNN: "Hizbullah threatens to bring down the government." Again, not exactly, Nasrallah and many others are calling for a National Unity government (there is one in Iraq, remember? - not exactly solving the current problems, however)

For outsiders - Lebanon does not have a democracy. It does have a peculiar arrangement of
shared rule by sect. It has not had a census since 1932; consquently, proportional representation is a little off. That is one source of Hizbullah's (and its allies) demand to add
four more ministers to the Cabinet in a National Unity Government.

Personal take: I wish that Nasrallah would acquiese on the point of a tribunal to investigate Hariri's assassination. After all, justice is a key aim of Islam. That might actually forward national unity.

The numbers of foreign fighters in Iraq - that number has
been under constant manipulation (and fluctuation). Why
should we believe that phantom foreign fighters are making
it back to Afghanistan, where it seems the Taliban are
energized force?

Sherifa - imeids (http://mideastislam.blogspot.com)



The Angry Arab News Service/وكالة أنباء العربي الغاضب

Please visit our new website!

http://mideastislam.com


mideastislam

News you may not receive in your "official" updates:

– On Israeli cluster bombs littering Lebanon

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6065574.stm


On the strategy of “starving out” Hamas

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/816/re51.htm


On American Middle East policy:

http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2004/04/ACHCAR/11101


On hints of freedom on Saudi TV

http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&section=0&article=88465&d=19&m=10&y=2006

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370155

From Gaza to the West Bank:
An Interview with Shaykh Hasan Yousef of HAMAS
June 27-28, 2005

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur



The frenzied media coverage of the evacuation of Jewish settlers from Gaza did not present many perspectives from the Palestinian side. When I visited Gaza in July, it was somewhat difficult to feel sympathy with the young protesters who had taken over Palestinian homes and a vacant hotel. There they raised orange flags symbolizing opposition to the withdrawal. That day, orange flags and plastic banners displayed on car antennas were flown all over Israel in protest, but blue flags fluttered as well to signal approval of the withdrawal.
The protesters were grouped atop a building throwing rocks at the roof of the house and small children of the Palestinian family living next to the previously empty building. They had broken the solar heating panel on the roof of the building and aimed at us as well. The father of the family was red-eyed, explaining that he had stayed up all night lest the protesters storm the house, or injure his 11 children in the middle of the night. Israeli soldiers had arrived, but had not yet received orders to remove protesters. His eldest son, a quiet boy of 16, had put on his kafiyya (head cloth) as a sign of resistance, and will no doubt remember this incident for the rest of his life.

Across the street, the Army had bulldozed beach cottages to prevent resistors from using these as similar bases. Further down the coast, a large group of settlers were holed up in an abandoned beach-front hotel. Israeli soldiers were present, but had not yet received orders to remove the young people. They had traveled to Gaza in some instances from New York, or Jerusalem; they were not members of the nearby settlement. An Arabic-speaking Israeli colleague told me ruefully that his son was among the demonstrators, and the two of them had argued strenuously about the issue. He is on the “blue-side,” supporting withdrawal from Gaza.

Settlers stand to lose from the disengagement, and so they and their supporters resisted. Who stands to win? The people of al-Mawasi` might benefit, I thought at the time. Al-Muwasi` is a narrow strip of land, one kilometer wide by fourteen kilometers in length just to the west of the Gush Qatif settlement. Ever since Gush Qatif was founded, the people of the area were subjected to severe restrictions. Many have homes and families in the cities of Khan Yunis or Rafah, but could not travel there The area is agricultural, and the residents used to fish, but were later forbidden to
do so. I photographed their boats lining the sandy beach.

I then interviewed a group of Palestinian truck drivers from al-Mawasi’ who wait for hours in the hot sun for permission to drive through the checkpoint. Some of their trucks were delayed for so long that the tomatoes they carry will be good only for canned sauce. They look forward to the disengagement and to resumption of fishing and use of the coast, but they expressed some cynicism about the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has announced its intentions to provide security to the area. I also interviewed their mukhtar, or town leader, who more formally and cautiously expressed his hopes for the future.

Many questions about the future concern HAMAS, the Islamist party that is more popular in Gaza than the PA.

The next day, I met with Shaykh Hasan Yousef, who heads the political division of the West Bank branch of HAMAS. As a senior leader and spokesperson of the organization, he has survived assassination attempts, imprisonment, exile, and infighting. He, like others, is responding to divisions on each side of the conflict; Israelis divided over disengagment, and Palestinians divided over the future of their own political leadership and proper means of securing sovereignty. Palestinians, particularly in Ramallah, Jenin, Jericho, and Jerusalem, do not see the Gaza withdrawal as a great triumph – it was not, after all, a plan that they were initially party to. Their recent concerns center on the behavior of armed Palestinian groups in Ramallah, and some of the border patrol in Jerusalem (this on the heels of a local scandal). Palestinians were concerned about the intentions of the PA in its crackdown on certain Al-Aqsa brigades, and the possibility that the Authority was implicated in, or unwilling or unable to control armed groups’ shakedowns or harassment of local citizens.

HAMAS had refused to participate in a national unity cabinet earlier in July. Yousef stated that HAMAS had no wish to be part of the PA, known locally as the sulta, just for the sake of presenting a united front to the Israelis, when issues deeply divide these secularly and religiously based organizations. Instead, the HAMAS Party would wait for upcoming elections.[i]

Just prior to the meeting, I visited Yassir Arafat’s grave at the Muqata` in Ramallah, a small enclosure in that windswept hilltop location which symbolizes the end of an era. Yousef’s business offices displayed none of the excessive grandeur, or nouveau chic of the villas of Ramallah; they comprised a small unit, with a waiting room and desk area outside, as Yousef is frequently interviewed. Those staffing Shaykh Yousef’s office were well apprised of local events and sentiments. Yousef’s twenty-eight year old son provided tea, fruit, a fan and biographical details while I waited for the Shaykh to complete his prior appointment. Shaykh Yousef then supplied more background, speaking in beautifully phrased formal Arabic.

Shaykh Yousef joined the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization originally established in 1929 by Shaykh Hasan al-Banna, in Isma’iliyya, an Egyptian city in the Suez Canal zone. In the 1940s, the organization grew and Muslims from other countries formed branches in the Sudan, Syria, Palestine, and elsewhere. Yousef became a member of the Muslim Brotherhood while at university in Jordan, where he obtained a BA in shari`ah (Islamic law) in the early 1970s. The Jordanian and Palestinian branch of the organization was not large until the Islamist movements in the region as a whole began to expand in the 1970s. In the late 1980s, HAMAS formed from elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. The primary founders of the Party are clerics, and other leaders are intellectuals and professionals..

Yousef is well-known in the West Bank, even in the countryside, because he used to travel from village to village to preach in the mosques, and people remember him from these early days. HAMAS subsequently acquired its own reputation, and he is associated with its growth. His son recalls the first time he was arrested by the Israelis and that his family had no income, or even food while he was incarcerated. He was repeatedly arrested, released, then re-arrested, once after only five hours, for periods lasting years.

The Israelis exiled hundreds of Islamist party members to Marj al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon in 1992, and Yousef was among them. They reasoned that exiling these individuals would diminish the numbers of recruits to HAMAS in the prison population. The exiles became a bargaining chip, and reportedly established closer ties with Hizbullah.

The Shaykh and his son explained that Hamas did not develop a military wing until 1987. After that date, when the Israeli authorities went after the organization, they generally pursued the political leadership, rather than the military wing of the organization because they could not locate, or target the latter. Shaykh Yousef was most recently released from prison in Israel in November of 2004. In March of that year, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the director-general of HAMAS was killed by an Israeli missile, as was his successor, `Abd al-Aziz Rantisi.

HAMAS refused to participate in the elections for a Palestinian president after Arafat’s death. HAMAS is now competing with the PA for the “hearts and minds” of Palestinians, and Yousef is hard at work campaigning for the Party, in preparation for the next set of Palestinian elections.[ii]

SHY: Welcome, welcome.

SZ: After introducing myself, explaining my interests, and that I am not visiting in any official capacity, I inquire about HAMAS statements about the war on Islam vs. the war on terror.

SHY: We welcome this opportunity to be permitted to communicate with you. We want to establish better relations with those in the West, and share and explain our views, hoping this will lead to an improved dialogue in the future. But, I want to know whether you think there will be any sort of shift, or is there already any kind of shift in U.S. policy toward the Palestinians?

SZ. Our country is not of one mind. Certainly, there is a high level of popular anxiety that has resulted from the terrible events of 9/11 and that is not improving the prospects for dialogue. But many of us support our government and our Constitution, without agreeing with all aspects of our foreign policy, and we are free to express our concerns in that regard.


Let me ask you, how do you view the situation now? What will the period following the Gaza disengagement bring?

SHY: Now, we are facing a critical situation. We are very hopeful in light of the disengagement from Gaza, however, removal of the settlers still means that all of the key issues that would lead to improved Israeli-Palestinian relations have yet to be discussed. These are, for instance:

*deliberate erosion of Arab (East) Jerusalem;
*the Wall, or security boundary;
*the large number of Palestinian political prisoners, still 8,000 of them. And
remember that in every agreement we have made, the Israelis promised to release
them, but they have only released small numbers, and at the same time, have
arrested many more Palestinians;
*closure of our charitable institutions.

HAMAS reputation is excellent. People trust us and know that we will help them, but now we are not allowed to do so. This is not actually hurting us, or our reputation; but these closures [of charitable institutions] are affecting the most vulnerable and poorest sector of Palestinian society. Of course we are ready to adopt any measures of transparency as required in the provision of charitable assistance, and in fact, we were already one of the most transparent groups. Anyway, our records would be totally open to any kind of scrutiny, but we believe the Palestinian people need assistance.

SZ: If you were able to communicate directly with our government about HAMAS’ aims and opinions, what would you say?

SHY: If I could make a list of items to present to President George Bush, all of the points that I already mentioned above would be on the list, but also most importantly,

*deliver measures of actual freedom to Palestinians; allowing him or her human and political rights.

*please become aware of, and alert your administration to the contradiction inherent in promoting democratization in the Middle East while simultaneously backing a system [Israeli] in which every physical movement, every telephone call, every meeting, every conversation is monitored, and there is no freedom at all.

Besides, there are “wanted” individuals that the Israelis have not been able to apprehend for years. These measures have not helped them do so. Why are they able to remain in hiding? Because they defend the population and the population reciprocates.

SZ: Do you spend time speaking about HAMAS outside of the region?

SHY: This has not been possible because of the political situation here, restrictions of travel and so on.

So do you think there is any opening for HAMAS now?

SZ: I believe there are those who understand this region more thoroughly than others and have witnessed the growth of the Islamic awakening who are realists. They believe that moderates can participate politically in a responsible manner and encourage others to cease violence.

SHY; But why are there objections to HAMAS?

SZ: The Israelis characterize your organization as a violent organization. And people everywhere are afraid of Islamist organizations that utilize violence.

But also there are other problems – some people are not very familiar with all of the range of Islamist groups and they lump them together and do not distinguish between one group and another. They see your organization as being the same as say, the Refah (Welfare) Party in Turkey or extremist salafi (purist) Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia.

Also, Westerners complain about your position on women’s rights. Do you impose Islamic covering as the Gama`at al-Islamiyya did in Egypt? Is there not tension between the secular Palestinian women’s parties (which developed from the four parties of the PLO) and Hamas on particular projects since the Oslo period?

SHY: We are most progressive on women’s issues! It is really irresponsible for people to characterize us in this way. And you can talk to my wife! I have been married more than 30 years. I would never tell her not to work, though she prefers not to, she is free to work or to be politically engaged. We in HAMAS have large numbers of women members who ran for office and were elected. We have never imposed the hijab. And unlike the PLO, we have women as part of our leadership and on our planning committees.

The young male assistant (who has been taking notes on the meeting) repeats that the secular parties of the PLO never included women in the leadership, and explains that women are active at the university level of HAMAS as well.

SZ: But no one has seriously written about the role of women in your organization or your views on gender, so people automatically associate groups who prefer Islamization with the gender attitudes of groups like the Taliban. They don’t know there is any difference.

SHY: We also include Christians on our political [electoral] list. In other words they run as HAMAS. We have protected the Christians of Ramallah. There was an incident a few years ago when people were attacking some of the Christians here, and HAMAS intervened and stopped all of this.

Regarding Iraq:

SHY: The United States is falling deeper and deeper into the Iraqi abyss. It has spent billions of dollars and will go on spending billions at a time when the American economy is not at all healthy at home. The authorities recently spoke of a U.S. presence in Iraq lasting 12 years. 12 years is impossible! The United States should withdraw immediately and allow the Iraqis to manage their own security situation.

The United States should allow for open, free elections in Iraq, not restricting participation as in the last election (he is referring to the exclusion of candidates, and lack of Sunni participation). Indeed, they should just disband this current government and elect another.

SZ: The Iraqi forces are not yet ready to defend their own country without assistance. Perhaps by the end of 2006, the Iraqi border patrol, police, national guard, and military will be in much better shape.

SHY: No, no. In this case, the United States should allow another Arab country to come in to Iraq and defend them.

And in response to a question about HAMAS’ position vis-a-vis the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.

SHY: Yes, there is tension there, but there is also conflict within Israeli society that will be dealt with.

SHY: Thank you very much for the opportunity to share my organization’s views with you and we express all hopes for a much better future.


[i] “Hamas Will Not Join Unity Government,” Al-Jazeera, July 5, 2005, available in English at http://english.aljazeera.net.

[ii] HAMAS provided a strong challenge to Fatah in the last elections. The Party dominated in the polls in Gaza, but is not as strong in the West Bank where, in the last elections, Fatah received 44.4% of the vote (136 seats) to Hamas’ 36% (or 110) seats.

See Also http://www.cesint.org



AHMADINEJAD: THE ‘PEOPLE’S’ MAN AND THE IRANIAN DILEMMA

Sherifa Zuhur[1]

(Translation)

Is President Ahmadinejad representative of a neoconservative trend in Iran, one that desires heightened conflict with the West? Is there a relationship between the new President’s belligerent statements to the West, his certainty that outsiders can perceive and accept Iran’s worldview, and growing Iranian influence in Iraq, as well as Iran’s determination to develop nuclear capabilities? How has America responded to Ahmadinejad thus far? He has taken a novel approach – writing directly to President Bush and expressed his certainty that Bush is a Believer with a capital “B.”
One response is that Ahmadinejad himself does not matter. The question is essentially one of regional politics, Great Power politics, and the legacy of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, i.e. domestic politics. Whether one approaches policymaking from a personalized or systemic perspective, Western antipathy to the Iranian President concerns his domestic as well as foreign policy as he has become a symbol of intransigence, or stubbornness toward U.S. Middle East policy. Ahmadinejad becomes larger than his office, and is the face behind Iran’s alleged misdeeds in Iraq, namely connections with Shi`a militias and insurgents, or infiltration by Iranian religious officials. [2]
Iran’s decision to pursue the development of nuclear technology further complicates the repute of its President. He rejected earlier European offers of a light-water facility in return for Iran’s cessation of its nuclear program as a deal where they offered candy and took gold. Was this European offer half-hearted or ill conceived? Is it possible to offer Iran more appropriate incentives, or only harsher measures?
In an American vision of a New Middle East, the Taliban are gone, as is Saddam Hussein’s government. Syrian troops have withdrawn from Lebanon. Municipal elections were held in Saudi Arabia, and Egypt did open its electoral system to certain new candidates despite many constraining requirements. The Islamic Republic of Iran, labeled a part of the “Axis of Evil,” by President Bush remains in place. Not only were Iranians unable to promote reformers in their elections, the Majlis has been taken over by conservatives and neoconservatives. Further, Rafsanjani was defeated, and Ahmadinejad, whose victory was unanticipated in the West, assumed the Presidency and has obtained some applause in the Islamic world for standing up to the United States. This Iran simply does not fit in with the American neoconservative vision of a New Middle East.
The exclusion of more than a thousand candidates from the June 2005 elections also encouraged the U.S. administration to emphasize the absence of freedom, democratic practices and censorship in Iran. President Bush said “America believes that freedom is the birthright and deep desire of every human soul. And to the Iranian people, I say: As you stand for your own liberty, the people of America stand with you.”[3] His statement was played all day long on Iranian television, but was interpreted differently than the President had intended, as an insult to national pride. Some 63% of Iranians came out to vote. Since then, Mahmud Ahmadinejad has continued to emphasize national honor and pride in the current struggle over Iran’s “right” to develop its nuclear program. He is more than just a lightening rod for populist sentiment in Iran, or a spokesperson for anti-American and anti-Western grievances. His determination has led him to audacious speech and actions, including his letter to President Bush, which, inconclusive in itself, broke with the Iranian policy of non-communication with Great Satan.
Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has bureaucratized elements of Iranian Shi`i practice, emphasizing the reformation of public space,[4] and a more rational, rule-bound, and conscious approach to Islamic life. Those who saw hope for a counterrevolution in the Do-e Khordad, or reform movement, also pointed to the unpopularity of enforced religious views, and a youth counterculture in Iran. Instead, it seems that Iran’s older and younger generations represent different trends, and political and religious views. Ahmadinejad projects the image of both a javanmard (new Islamic man), and a mardomyar (a people’s man), ordinary and plain. He appeals to Iranians outside the bases of power, who remain deeply pious, but want to live in better circumstances,
The son of a blacksmith, Ahmadinejad was born in Aradan, Iran in 1956 and raised in a working class neighborhood of east Tehran. He was still a student during the protests against the Shah. He has been falsely charged with being one of the hostage-takers, or of planning the take-over of the U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1979.[5] The actual hostage-takers emphatically denied these rumors, which may have been spread by an opposition group, the Mujahidin al-Khalq. He was an excellent student and a talented soccer player. Childhood and student friends describe him as obstinate and confident of popular support. After graduating to teaching his own classes, he distinguished himself by wearing a Palestinian headscarf while on campus.[6] Ahmadinejad served in the basij (militia) after the Revolution, then in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iraq-Iran war. It was during that conflict that many of Iran’s second-wave revolutionaries came of age. Many belong to the Abadgaran,[7] (Builders, or Developers of Islamic Iran) a neo-conservative alliance. The Abadgaran together with the conservatives now form a majority in the Majlis, and have contained the reformers, or what some call the Left in Iran. Ahmadinejad has also acknowledged his role as a leading member of a different party, the Islamic Revolution Devotees Society.[8]
Ahmadinejad earned a doctorate in traffic engineering, became a professor, an advisor in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and a governor. He was appointed the Mayor of Tehran, May 3, 2003, and attained a reputation for quiet efficiency that won him the support of Tehran’s poor in the presidential election and a short-listing in the 2004 Mayor of the Year awards. Critics mention that he redesigned the capital while mayor with Imam Mahdi’s return in mind, broadening the streets for his return,[9] and some in Tehran said he was so conservative that he would have established separate male and female sidewalks, elevators, and graveyards had that been possible. This may be true, but more recently, Ahmadinejad supported women’s attendance of soccer games.[10] Like populist leader, President Gamal abd al-Nasser, his lifestyle reflected his values; he lived in a modest home in his childhood neighborhood and drove a Paykan, Iran’s cheapest car.
He made numerous campaign appearances in mosques and prayer areas where he focused on the needs of the lower classes. He is not a cleric, in fact he is the first non-cleric in the office of the President for a quarter of a century. His speech is easily understood by the Iranian population, unlike the clerics with their references in classical Arabic, and he identifies with their millenarian passions. It is rumored that his list of cabinet members had been dropped into the well at the Jamkaram mosque, the locus of Mahdi-centered worship, according to local custom.[11] Ahmadinejad fired many senior financiers and bankers, senior diplomats replacing them with more junior personnel, frequently with IRG backgrounds, and replaced all governors with his loyalists. These point to the degree of power in his office and connections, though Iran-watchers commented on his naiveté, and novice clumsiness. Nevertheless, the Supreme Guide, Khamene’i had seemingly wrapped his cloak around him, urging patience.
Bases of power in the Iranian government are formally defined in the office of the Supreme Faqih, the Council of Guardians, (the Supreme Faqih directly appoints half its members) the Majlis, or Consultative Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, the High Council of Justice (appointed by the Supreme Faqih), the President, the Cabinet, and the Supreme National Security Council. The Supreme Faqih and the Supreme National Security Council along with the Majlis and the Council of Guardians craft foreign policy. The Supreme National Security Council is currently headed by Ali Larijani[12] who is simultaneously Iran’s chief spokesperson and negotiator on nuclear issues. He like, Ahmadinejad is close to the Supreme Faqih. The membership of the SNSC includes military leaders from the army and Revolutionary Guard, and top ministry officials.
The Presidential office weakened after Bani Sadr challenged Khomeini and had to flee Iran; then, the current Supreme Faqih, Ayatollah Khamene’i served as President for two terms. President Khatami fought to strengthen the Presidency since 1997, differing with Khamene’i about Iran’s ability to survive in isolation.[13] However his challenge was essentially undone by hardliners. Today, Ahmadinejad has strengthened the office of the President, but his power should be thought of as one of several key points in series of interlocking circles. These circles are networks, acknowledged, or informal, that connect the Supreme Faqih and the other offices mentioned, encompass some six hundred persons. [14]
President Ahmadinejad represents the renewal of “Islamic” foreign policy, namely Ayatollah Khomeini’s iteration of Islamic goals as universal. In this revolutionary Shi`i worldview, Iran was to support the oppressed masses elsewhere, meaning the Shi`a of Lebanon, other Shi`i minorities, but also the Palestinians. Khomeini and his Hezbe Jumhuriyye Islami ( IRP) explained that the Shah had betrayed Muslims with his support of Israel. Instead Palestine was a vaqf, a religious endowment that cannot be negotiated away even by the Palestinians themselves. Israel’s nuclear profile and continuing hardnosed approach to the Palestinians continues to disturb Iranians. Ahmadinejad’s July 2006 statements about the Palestinians allude to Muslim unity against Israel, and also to the lack of justice in their treatment.[15] His fall 2005 attacks on Israel as a ''tumor" that should be ''wiped off the map of the world" were not very novel, but just prior to the flurry of media interest in them, Khamene’i had granted more power to Rafsanjani, and the Council of Guardians had agreed on reconvening with the Europeans regarding the nuclear issue. Ahmadijenad might have wanted to reclaim center stage[16] at that time. Shortly thereafter the cartoon incident put a strain on Muslim-Western relations.
In July of 2006, President Bush was asked informally to identify his greatest concern with Iran. It is instructive that he did not name, nor demonize the Iranian President. But he did say that was concerned about “having a nuclear weapon in the midst of the Middle East,” the prospect of “political blackmail” and that “they [Iran] would harm our ally, Israel.” [17]
Experts dispute Iran’s economic situation and the impact that any new sanctions imposed as a result of its failure to end its nuclear program would have on the country. The Islamic revolution has clearly not relieved the misery of the masses. More than 35% of Iran’s families live in poverty and there is a youth bulge. Homeless children sleep in Tehran’s streets. While educational levels are higher than in some other countries, still 23% are illiterate, and Iran has a large HIV/AIDs problem due to the presence of at least 2 million intravenous drug users. The regime has not treated the poor well, denying rations to migrants, attacking squatters,[18] and street vendors because of the visibility they grant to Iran’s poverty. Afghani and Iraqi refugees add further strains. Ken Pollack of the Brookings Institute, points to crippling levels of corruption, frightened investors, spur unemployment and inflation and can’t be solved without major clean-up or high levels of investment. Moreover, Iran can only look to the U.S., Europe, or Japan for markets, China, Russia, and possibly India cannot stand in at this time.[19] However, some Iranians say that the country is not in such bad shape with growth at 5.5% per year, and a doubling of GDP per capita in the last five years. The country possesses $10 billion stabilization fund and other resources. If Iran is not so desperate economically, then Pollock’s proposed “butter for guns” solution, threatening severe sanctions if Iran will not cease its nuclear program, may fail.
Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. suggest that the effects of economic sanctions are far from certain. Some countries lack incentives to comply with them.[20] Italy, France, Germany and the UK, as well as Japan, Russia and China would likely lose a great deal of money if they ceased exporting to Iran and importing oil from it.[21] Other countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are unlikely to support sanctions though strategic rather than economic reasons.[22] We should remember that existing sanctions against Iran in place since the Islamic Revolution failed to accomplish their goals.[23]
Ahmadinejad’s position reflects Iran’s ambivalent situation. The U.S. presence in Iraq, and in Afghanistan on Iran’s other border, places Iran in a strategic sandwich. Even with an eventual American withdrawal from Iraq, that country’s army is going to be a very large one. Iraq’s new government may wish to revive a nuclear program if Iran continues its efforts, but Israel presents a more immediate threat.
Ahmadinejad appealed to reason in his 18 page letter to President Bush, a very unusual diplomatic approach to this issue in which he also attempted to explain Iran’s stance toward Israel, and decried the events of 9/11, but also the American response to 9/11, as well as saying that “liberalism and Western style democracy have not been able to help realize the ideals of humanity,” instead people now await the will of God.[24] According to his logic, the United States should not suppress any nation’s right to develop or defend itself. Iran’s nuclear program grew from Muhammad Reza Shah’s vision of Iran as the prime military power in the Gulf region. He built up a military arsenal via petrodollars and in 1967 a five-megawatt thermal research reactor at the Tehran Research Center was established and supplied by the U.S. The Americans trained Iranian technicians as well. Nuclear power and weapons development continued with the assistance of Germany, and later China and Russia, although the U.S. ended all nuclear agreements with Iran in 1979. Iran signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan in 1987 and China and the Soviet Union in 1990.[25] As Iran responded to the concerns of the EU and IAEA regarding its nuclear program, it continuously restated its bottom line, that Iran has the right to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program as well as enrichment capacity.[26] The Iranian Majlis approved a bill that would allow Iran to block inspections if the IAEA were to refer the country to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions.[27]
Incidentally, fatwas against use of the nuclear bomb are frequently attributed to the late Ayatollah Khomeini, but he did not oppose the development of nuclear energy. Iran’s Foreign Ministry officials also refer to Khamene’i’s fatwa disallowing nuclear weapons.[28] More recently, cleric, Mohsen Garavian, disciple of Ayatullah Mesbah-Yazdi has stated that it is only “natural” that Iran should have nuclear bombs as a “countermeasure” to other nuclear powers.[29] The principle that extreme measures are permitted in defensive jihad underlies this statement. Has the ascent of Iran’s neoconservatives worsened the issue? Would it have been easier to resolve the nuclear issue if Rafsanjani and not Ahmadinejad were President? Looking at Khatami and Rafsanjani as compared to Ahmadinejad, on this issue shows us that the nuclear issue matters deeply to the regime no matter who is President. President Khatami progressed from statements more open to the West to extremely volatile ones nearer the end of his term, when he too declared Iran’s sovereign rights to pursue its uranium enrichment if it so chose. Had Rafsanjani been elected, he may not have been able to avoid the nationalist bottom line either.[30] In spring of 2006, the Iranians defiantly revealed that they had enriched uranium. The IAEA documented various technical accomplishments, but experts point out that Iran cut corners in its research and development process, and would require more time now for development and testing.[31] David Albright projected about three years toward a single nuclear weapon (2009), whereas John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence has suggested a lengthier waiting period.[32] Opponents to negotiations with Iran reminded the world has played for time before. It could be continuing its scientific process over the summer of 2006. An agreement might be unattainable. Or Iran may well agree and then default. Those who argue for some form of negotiation in addition to containment, or “rollback,”[33] and deterrence, also suggest grave implications for Western interests from Iran’s nuclear ambitions. First, Iran might be less vulnerable to U.S. conventional force, and secondly, Iran’s program cannot but encourage proliferation elsewhere.[34] In other words, the most obvious concerns about Iran’s nuclear program have little relationship to the ideological character of the state.[35] There are those who advise expanded negotiations or military action against Iran. The former option would provide political, as well as economic or technical incentives for Iran’s cooperation with Europe and the United States. Such negotiations would prepare a deal that Iranians really desire, including consideration of Iran’s security needs, a guarantee that the U.S. relinquishes the policy of regime change in Iran, unfreezing of Iranian assets and that sanctions be lifted.[36] One definite problem with the idea of broader negotiation is that it ignores the significant human rights violations ongoing in Iran, but perhaps the issue could be worked into the proposal. In any case, expanded negotiations are not on the table now, and the United States has not forgone a goal of regime change in Iran. Taking military action in response to Iran’s nuclear program is also fraught with problems. A ground and air war campaign could secure the country, but an insurgency would ensue. Accurately targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities make the option of limited air strikes more complicated, and less attractive than it might otherwise be. Military strikes are likely to generate some kind of Iranian response to the U.S. in Iraq, and some experts then cite the existing Iranian influence in Shi’a entities there, including militias, as a serious concern.[37] President Ahmadinejad and other neoconservatives would be most probably empowered by this response. Popular support would grow, and they could argue that the United States had acted true to form. Therefore, the current EU-3 track and option of sanctions against Iran, effective or not, has the advantage of uniting Europe and the United States with a more reluctant China and Russia, and isolating Iran should it reject this diplomatic gambit.[38] William O. Beeman of Brown University has suggested that in some ways President Ahmadinejad and President Bush are mirror images, by which, he is surely pointing to the importance of faith politics in both countries. Today’s crisis is larger than the two men, or the question of religious fundamentalism. Dynamics between Iran and the United States are symptomatic of the globalization of foreign policy, the “new world order,” and the ambitions for a New Middle East.






[1] The author is Professor of Islamic and Regional Studies, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College and Director, Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Diasporic Studies. The views expressed in this monograph are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

[2] Craig Gordon, “Iran Cited as Threat in Iraq,” Newsday.com June 23, 2006; Ivan Eland, et al. “Occupied Iraq: One Country, Many Wars.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, Issue 3, Fall 2005; Raymond Tanter, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2004.
[3] The White House, “Statement by the President on Iranian Elections.” June 16, 2005.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Most sources who spread this rumor apparently hoped to discredit Ahmadinejad prior to, or shortly after the June 2005 election. Even non-Western sources repeated these allegations. For example, Wikipedia relies on information from Al Jazeera “Profile,” June 19, 2005. But student leaders from those days, Abbas Abdi and Ibrahim Asgharzadeh, who in no way support Ahmadinejad, in addition to three other student leaders, denied that he took part in the action or played any leading role. New York Times, July 1, 2005; Washington Post July 1 2005; “Iran Victor ‘Kidnap Role’ Probe” BBC News. June 30, 2005.
[6] Iason Athanasiadis, “Ahmadinejad: A Study in Obstinacy,” Asia Times, May 19, 2006.

[7] http://www.abadgaran.ir/
[8] Abbas William Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, Winter 2006.
[9] Scott Peterson, “Waiting for the Rapture in Iran.” Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 2005.
[10] Athanasiadis.

[11] Peterson.

[12] Larijani is closely connected with leading clerics as the son of Ayatollah Hashim Amoli and the son-in law of the late Ayatollah Mortaza Motahhari. One of his brothers, Sadegh, is a member of the Council of Guardians, and two others are Iran’s foreign service. He ran for President in the 2005 elections, but was less popular than Ahmadinejad or Mohammad Ghalibaf, receiving only slightly over 5% of the vote despite his centrality to the neoconservatives. His blog diary was posted on Jamjam in preparation to the elections and is quite revealing. http://www.jamejamonline.ir/shownews2.asp?n=65634&t=feet
[13] Shahram Chubin, Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002. 24-26.
[14] Abbas William Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, Winter 2006.

[15] Associated Press, July 7, 2006; also see “La lettre de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad á George W. Bush.” Le Monde, May 5, 2006.

[16]Karim Sadjapour and Ray Takeyh, “Behind Iran’s Hard-line on Israel.” Boston Globe. December 23, 2005.
[17]Transcript of Larry King with President Bush and Mrs. Bush. Available at www.cnn.com July 6, 2006.
[18] Asef Bayat, Poor People’s Movements in Iran: Street Politics New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 101-108.
[19] Ken Pollack, “Iran: Three Alternative Futures,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, June 2006.

[20] Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails.” Draft April 7, 2006. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 15-18, 29.
[21] George Perkovitch with Silvia Manzanero, “Iran Gets the Bomb – Then What?” in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson eds., 185-189.
[22] Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 17.

[23] Ibid, 18.

[24] “La lettre de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad á George W. Bush.” Le Monde, May 5, 2006.
[25] For details on Iran’s military ties to China and purchases of hardware, see Bates Gill, “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-Making in an Era of Reform.” in David M. Lampton, ed. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001; and Richard Russell, “China’s WMD Foot in the Greater Middle East’s Door.” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2005.
[26] Erich Marquardt, “Iran’s ‘Right to Enrich’ Uranium,” Asia Times, March 12, 2004; Alissa J. Rubin “Iran Builds Support for Right to Nuclear Power.” Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2006
[27] Associated Press, “Iran May Block Nuclear Inspections.” November 20, 2005.

[28] Hamid Reza Assefi, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, September 12, 2004; “Iran, US Nuclear Fears Overblown,” Los Angeles Times, November 5, 2004.
[29] Sunday Telegraph, February 19, 2002.

[30] International Crisis Group, “Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad’s Victory Mean?” Middle East Briefing No. 18, Tehran/Brussels 4 August 2005, 12-13.
[31] Robert Einhorn, “The Iran Nuclear Issue.” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. May 17, 2006. Available at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 3.
[32]David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The Clock is Ticking, But How Fast?” The Institute for Science and International Security, March 27, 2006; Einhorn, 4.
[33] Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran.” McNair Paper 69. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005,
[34] Kenneth Pollack, “ A Multilateral Approach to Iran,“ in Ivo Daalder, Nicole Gnesotto and Philip Gordon, eds. Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 2006, 16 and Yaphe and Lutes, 30-31. Yaphe and Lutes present various possible scenarios if Iran achieves nuclear weapons, a la Iraq (pre-emptive strike), North Korea (Iran cheats), or India (the world condemns Iran but does nothing).
[35] Bruno Tertrais, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis,” in Daalder, Gnesotto and Gordon, eds.

[36] Clifford Kupchan, “Iranian Beliefs and Realities,” National Interest, September 22, 2005.
[37] Ibid, 11-38.

[38] Philip Gordon . “Will America Attack Iran?” Prospect Online June 2006

Here is Amnesty's report on Israel's targeting of Lebanon
and Lebanese.

The U.S. media and experts should not report this as
"collateral damage" -- 7,000+ strikes on 7,000 plus targets by air
plus 2,500 from the sea and the evidence of the type of attacks
(families in their homes, cars, etc.) shows that these were deliberate,
and follow along a strategy of collective punishment.

http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE180072006